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JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal by LaSal Oil
Company, Inc. ("LaSal") pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k)
on the basis that it is a case transferred to the Court of Appeals
from

the

Utah

Supreme

Court.

The Utah

Supreme

Court had

jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22

( 3 ) (J) on the basis that the order from which LaSal seeks relief

was certified as a final order pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
IS8UES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Trial Court Err When it Held that the Term "Sudden" in
the Exception to the Pollution Exclusion Found in Omaha
Indemnity's Comprehensive General Liability Policy is
Unambiguous?
Standard of Review
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in

pertinent part as follows:
The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
In Fashion Place Investment, Ltd. v. Salt Lake County,
776 P.2d 941 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the Utah Court of Appeals
enunciated the standard when the trial court has granted a motion
for summary judgment:
Because summary judgment is granted as a
matter of law, we review the trial courts

- 1 -

conclusions of law for correctness. Id. If a
trial court interprets a contract as a matter
of law, that interpretation is not afforded
any particular deference on appeal.
Power
Sys. & Controls. Inc. v. Keith's Elec. Constr.
Co. . 765 P.2d 5, 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
[I]f the contract is ambiguous, but the case
is decided on summary judgment, we can affirm
only if the undisputed material facts,
concerning the parties' intent, demonstrate
the successful litigant's position is correct
as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
I<1. at 943. See also,
P. 2d

973,

976

interpretation

Stevenson v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 827

(Utah

Ct.

App.

1992)

of an insurance contract

(the

trial

is reviewed

court's
under a

correctness standard); Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., 821 P.2d 458, 460
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (the appellate court reviews the trial court's
conclusions of law for correctness, including its conclusions that
there are no material fact issues).
As set forth in Home Savings & Loan v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 817 P.2d

341, 347

(Utah Ct. App. 1991),

,f

[t]he

interpretation of a contract normally presents a question of law.11
Interpretation of an insurance contract by the district court is
given no particular deference on appeal.
2.

Assuming, Arguendo, That "Sudden" is Unambiguous and Has a
Temporal Aspect of Abruptness, Did the Court Nevertheless Err
in Holding That the Release of Gasoline From Plaintiff's
Underground Line Was Not "Sudden"?
Standard of Review
An appellate court, in reviewing a summary judgment,

analyzes the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to
the losing party. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225,
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229 (Utah 1987).

As stated in Hunt v. ESI Engineering. Inc.. 808

P.2d 1137, 1139 (Utah Ct. App. 1991):
Summary judgment is appropriate only when no
genuine issue of material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.... The facts and inferences to
be drawn therefrom are viewed in the light
most favorable to the losing party and are
affirmed only where it appears that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material issues
of fact, or where, even according to the facts
as contended by the losing party, the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. (Citations omitted.)
See also,

Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta. Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 623-34

(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in
the Trial Court.
This is a declaratory judgment action filed by LaSal
against nine insurance companies which provided

comprehensive

general liability and excess liability coverage for a service
station owned and operated by LaSal in Moab, Utah (the "LaSal
Station"). The insurance policies provided coverage for the period
from April 1, 1975 through March 8, 1986.

LaSal requested the

court to declare that the defendant insurers had a duty to defend
LaSal in three underlying actions (the "Underlying Actions")1 and
1

The underlying actions are:
Arthur Ross, et al. v. LaSal Oil Co., et al.. Civil No. 5660,
Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Grand County, State of
Utah ("Ross");
Hartford Leasing Corp. v. LaSal Oil, et al.. Civil No. 5692,
Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Grand County, State of
Utah ("Hartford"); and
- 3 -

to indemnify LaSal for any judgment or settlement arising out of
claims in those three actions.

In the Underlying Actions, the

plaintiffs and the State of Utah alleged that LaSal, among others,
had released gasoline from underground storage tanks and/or lines
and had thereby caused property damage and bodily injury. The Utah
Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association (the "Guaranty
Association") was added as a defendant because two of the insurers,
Midland

Insurance

Company

("Midland") and

Carriers

Insurance

Company ("Carriers"), declared insolvency and were, accordingly,
insured by the Guaranty Association pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
31A-28-20 et seq.
On September 10, 1990, LaSal filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment against three of the defendants—Omaha Indemnity
("Omaha"), Travelers Insurance Company ("Travelers") and Allianz
Insurance Company ("Allianz")—requesting

that the court declare

that these three primary carriers had a duty to defend LaSal in the
Underlying Actions (R. 491-495). Defendants Travelers, Allianz and
Omaha filed cross-motions for summary judgment requesting the court
to declare that these three insurers had no liability under their
policies and, accordingly, no duty to defend or indemnify LaSal.
At a hearing before the district court on May 17, 1991
(R. 3046-3194), the court expressed concern as to whether it could
rule on the issues of the insurers' duties to defend and indemnify
when so little was known regarding the timing of the initial

In the Matter of LaSal Oil Co., e t a L , Civil No. 90-039-OHI,
and the Order to Abate, No. 8712456 issued in accordance thereto
(the "State Action").
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release of gasoline from the underground line at the LaSal Station.
Accordingly,

the court

undertaken regarding

ordered

that

additional

discovery be

(1) the timing of the initial release of

gasoline from the underground line and (2) the timing of the
property damage/personal injuries in the Underlying Actions.

As

part of this discovery, LaSal asked its hydrogeologic consultant,
EarthFax Engineering, Inc. ("EarthFax") to review the available
data on the hydrocarbon contamination in Moab and to estimate the
date when the discharge from the underground line began—assuming
for the purposes of this analysis only—that

all hydrocarbon

contamination in Moab was derived solely from the leak at the LaSal
Station and not from other potentially responsible parties.
addition

to reviewing

the existing

data,

EarthFax

additional sampling in Moab to aid in its analysis.

In

undertook

EarthFax set

forth its analysis and conclusions regarding the timing of the
hydrocarbon release at the LaSal Station in a report entitled
"Potential Timing of Hydrocarbon Leakage at LaSal Oil Company,"
dated October 31, 1991 (the "1991 EarthFax Report") (R. 16401663).2
Based upon the 1991 EarthFax Report, gasoline from the
LaSal

Station

environment

would

between

have

initially

February,

1983

2

been
and

released

into the

September,

1984.

In addition to the report, affidavits of Richard B. White,
the principle investigator at EarthFax who oversaw the work
conducted by EarthFax for LaSal in Moab, and the affidavit of Lonn
P. Hamp, the EarthFax hydrogeologist who authored the 1991 EarthFax
Report and who undertook the calculations found therein, were
submitted to the court (R. 1664-1671 and 1673-1679, respectively).
- 5 -

Accordingly, damage to the environment in the form of gasoline
pollution of the State's soils and groundwater resources would have
first

occurred within the Midland,

periods.

Carriers or Omaha Policy

LaSal argued that the court should, accordingly, hold

that Midland, Carriers and Omaha had a duty to defend LaSal in the
State Action.
The 1991 EarthFax Report also estimated that contaminants
would have arrived at the southern boundary of the Ross plaintiffs7
residential properties no sooner than July, 1986.

Any property

damage or bodily injury would have occurred after that date and, as
a result, would have occurred after the primary carriers' policy
periods. Based on the EarthFax estimates LaSal conceded that none
of the primary insurers, including Omaha or Carriers, owed a duty
to defend LaSal in Ross (R. 1634-1635).
On the basis of the 1991 EarthFax Report, LaSal further
argued that if the Hartford Leasing property were contaminated
solely by a gasoline release from the LaSal Station, contaminants
would have arrived at the Hartford Leasing property some time
between approximately October-November, 1984 and July, 1986 (R.
1635-1636).

As a result, contamination of the Hartford Leasing

property occurred some time during the Carriers or the Omaha Policy
periods. Accordingly, LaSal asked the court to hold that Carriers
and Omaha had a duty to defend LaSal in the Hartford action.
After hearings held on March 23, 1992 and October 20,
1992, the court granted Travelers' and Allianz' Motions for Summary
Judgment against LaSal on the basis that there was no evidence

- 6 -

establishing the possibility of an "occurrence," as defined in the
Travelers and Allianz policies, during the Travelers or Allianz
Policy periods.

Pursuant to such ruling, Travelers and Allianz

were dismissed with prejudice from the lawsuit (R. 1881-1883).
LaSal does not appeal the ruling dismissing Travelers and Allianz.
An evidentiary hearing was held before the district court
on December 17, 1992 wherein LaSal and Omaha presented expert
testimony to assist the court in determining whether the holes in
the underground gasoline line at the LaSal Station resulted in a
"sudden" discharge of gasoline (R. 3195-3320).

The Omaha Policy

excludes coverage for pollution, except where the discharge or
release is "sudden and accidental."
In a Memorandum Decision filed on January 21, 1993 (R.
1886-1893) , the district court ruled that the term "sudden" was not
ambiguous and that the release of gasoline at the LaSal Station was
not

"sudden" within the meaning

of the pollution

exclusion.

Accordingly, the district court determined that no coverage was
afforded

LaSal under the Omaha Policy.

In addition to the

Memorandum Decision, the district court filed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on February 11, 1993 (R. 1894-1903), together
with a Judgment (R. 1904-1906) in favor of Omaha, holding that
Omaha had no duty to defend or indemnify LaSal in any of the
Underlying Actions and that plaintiff's Complaint was dismissed
with prejudice on the merits.
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Omaha filed a Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification and
supporting memorandum on April 9, 1993 (R. 1929-1930 and 19201928) .
On May 4, 1993, upon the stipulation of counsel (R. 19321935), the district court ordered entry of summary judgment on
behalf of Chicago Insurance Co. ("Chicago") based upon the fact
that Chicago was the excess carrier for Omaha and the court having
found that there was no coverage under the Omaha Policy (R. 193 61939).

The Order of Summary

Judgment

on behalf of Chicago

incorporated by reference the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Judgment that were previously entered on behalf of Omaha.
Chicago filed a Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification on May 10, 1993
(R. 1949-1951).
In May, 1993, LaSal, the Guaranty Association and Zurich
Insurance Co. ("Zurich") entered into a Stipulation, Motion and
Order (R. 1962-1969), based upon the district court's January 20,
1993 Memorandum Decision (R. 1886-1893), the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (R. 1894-1903) , and the Judgment in favor of
Omaha (R. 1904-1906).

The stipulation provided that the Guaranty

Association was entitled to an Order granting it partial summary
judgment by reason of the pollution exclusion found in the Carrier
Policy.

The stipulation likewise provided Zurich was entitled to

an order granting it summary judgment as an excess insurer to the
Carrier Policy.

Based upon the Stipulation, the court granted

partial summary judgment to the Guaranty Association and summary
judgment to Zurich.

This Order was entered and filed with the

- 8 -

clerk of the Third Judicial District Court on May 27, 1993 (R.
1966-1969).
Plaintiff

LaSal

and defendants

Omaha, Chicago, the

Guaranty Association and Zurich entered into a Stipulation, Motion
and Order stipulating and moving the court for an order certifying
the three judgments to be final orders and that each of the
judgments be entered as final orders in accordance with Rule 54(b)
(R. 1962-1969). The three judgments certified as Rule 54(b) final
orders are found at R. 1904-1906, 1036-1939, 1958-1961.

It is

these three judgments, certified as Rule 54(b) final orders, from
which LaSal now appeals.
This appeal is taken from such part of the underlying
summary judgments which hold, as a matter of fact and law, that the
word

"sudden,"

as

found

in the

exception

to

the pollution

exclusion, is not ambiguous and has a temporal meaning, that the
holes in an underground gasoline transmission at the LaSal Station
did not result in a "sudden and accidental" discharge of gasoline,
and thus that the discharge or release did not fall within the
exception to the pollution exclusion found in the Omaha and
Carriers Policies, and that Omaha and Carriers had no duty to
defend or indemnify LaSal in the Underlying Actions.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

History of Hydrocarbon Contamination.
1.

Since 1977, LaSal has owned the LaSal Station,

located at 322 South Main, Moab, Utah (R. 1895, 5 1).
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2.

In approximately December, 1985, the Utah Department

of Health, Southeastern Utah Health District, located in Moab,
began receiving complaints of gasoline fumes in a building located
to the northwest of the LaSal Station.

The tenants of this

building include Walker Drug, Spencer's Office Supply and a medical
center (this building is hereinafter referred to as the "Walker
Drug Building").

By approximately April, 1987, hydrocarbon fumes

were reported in four private residences located approximately 475
to 600 feet northwest of the Walker Drug Building.
3.

In January, 1986, Ray Klepzig, President of LaSal,

learned of the presence of gasoline fumes in and adjacent to the
Walker Drug Building. Because of the possibility that the gasoline
fumes

might

be

due

to

a

release

from

the

LaSal

Station's

underground storage tanks and/or lines, LaSal had the lines and
tanks tested (R. 1896, 5 7; 3216-3217).
4.

As a result of this investigation, five small holes

were discovered in the coupling threads of an underground gasoline
transmission line between an underground gasoline storage tank and
a gasoline dispenser (R. 1896, 1 8 ; 3216-3223).3

LaSal replaced

all of the lines between the underground storage tanks and the

3

The pipe section with the five small holes was admitted as
Exhibit 1-P at the December 17, 1992 evidentiary hearing. Exhibit
4-D, also admitted into evidence, is a photograph of the same pipe
section (R. 1885).
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dispensers.

Since that time, all underground storage tanks and

lines at the LaSal Station have tested tight.4
5.
LaSal

Station

The underground gasoline transmission lines at the
were

subjected

at

all

times

approximately 25 pounds per square inch (psi).

to

pressure

of

When the gasoline

dispensers were activated the gasoline transmission lines were
subjected to approximately 40-45 psi of pressure (R. 1896; 3215).
6.

State and federal agencies began investigating the

hydrocarbon contamination in Moab. Preliminary data indicated that
a hydrocarbon plume contaminating the soils and ground water
extended from at least the vicinity of the Third South and South
Main intersection northwest toward the confluence of Pack and Mill
creeks (R. 2512-2515).
7.
Environmental

On

December

7,

1987,

Health and the Utah

the

Utah

Division

of

Solid and Hazardous Waste

Committee served Orders to Abate on LaSal and Rio Vista Oil Co.,
Ltd. ("Rio Vista") (R. 2189-2194, 3023-3027).

Rio Vista owns and

operates a gasoline station on the southeast corner of the Third
South and South Main intersection.
8.

The Utah Division of Environmental Health (now, the

Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ")), in accordance with
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46d-l, et seq. f held a formal adjudicative
hearing in October, 1990 on the Orders to Abate issued to LaSal and
Rio Vista. The purpose of the hearing, according to the State, was
4

A small hole in one of the underground lines, which was
discovered and promptly repaired in July 1992, is not relevant to
this action.
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to uphold the Orders to Abate issued to LaSal and Rio Vista.

On

October 31, 1991, the DEQ issued its Order, concluding that the
Orders to Abate issued to LaSal and Rio Vista were correct, as a
matter of law, and should be affirmed.

This conclusion was based

on the DEQ's findings that a release of petroleum products from the
LaSal and Rio Vista Stations had contributed to contamination of
soils and ground water in the Moab area. LaSal appealed the order
issued by the DEQ. On December 18, 1992, the Utah Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded the order of the DEQ on the basis that the
DEQ's findings of fact were insufficient to permit meaningful
appellate

review.

LaSal

Oil

Co. , Inc.

v.

Department

of

Environmental Quality. 843 P.2d 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
9.

On or about March 29, 1988, a civil action was filed

against LaSal and Rio Vista in the Seventh Judicial District Court
in and for Grand County, State of Utah, styled Arthur Ross, et al.
v. LaSal Oil Co., Rio Vista Oil, Ltd. and John Does 1-20, Civil No.
5660 (R. 2572-2597). The plaintiffs in Ross claimed that gasoline
fumes from the LaSal and Rio Vista Stations had entered their
homes.

In September, 1992, trial was held in the Seventh Judicial

District Court for Grand County.

The jury apportioned liability

between LaSal, Rio Vista and a third service station, the Auto Tire
Service Center.

A settlement was entered into between LaSal and

the plaintiffs after trial, and no judgment was entered against
LaSal.
10.

On or about June 3, 1988, a second civil action

styled Hartford Leasing Corp. v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., LaSalle fs±o1
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Oil Co., State of Utah, Dependable Janitorial Service and John Does
I-X, Civil No. 5692, was filed against LaSal, among others, in the
Seventh Judicial District Court of Grand County, State of Utah.
Plaintiff

alleged

that

petroleum

products

released

by

the

defendants resulted in the infiltration of hydrocarbon vapors into
the Moab Regional Center, a building owned by plaintiff (R. 25982612).
filed

In March, 1993, defendants LaSal and the State of Utah
motions

prosecution.

to

dismiss

plaintiff's

Complaint

for

lack of

Defendant Rio Vista joined the motions filed by the

State and LaSal.

In a ruling filed on June 21, 1993, the district

court granted defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint
with prejudice for failure to prosecute.

Plaintiff has appealed

this decision.
B.

The Insurance Policies.
11.

Carriers issued a comprehensive general liability

("CGL") policy under which LaSal was one of the named insureds,
Policy No. LP-400088 (the "Carriers Policy"), with a policy period
from April 1, 1983 to April 1, 1984.

The Carriers Policy was

renewed with coverage extended to April 1, 1985.

The Carriers

Policy was cancelled effective August 6, 1984 (R. 2019-2109).
12.

Carriers

was

declared

insolvent

and

ordered

liquidated by the Iowa District Court for Polk County, effective
January 16, 1986.
13.

Zurich issued a commercial umbrella liability policy

(the "Zurich Policy") under which LaSal was one of the named
insureds.

The Zurich Policy provided excess coverage above the
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underlying Carriers Policy.

The Zurich Policy is Policy No. CU

3101-012-00 and has a policy period from April 9, 1984 to April 9,
1985.

The Zurich Policy was cancelled effective July 1, 1984 (R.

6).
14.

Omaha issued a CGL policy under which LaSal was one

of the named insureds, Policy No. CL000269 (the "Omaha Policy"),
with a policy period from July 1, 1984 to July 1, 1985 (R. 1895, f
2).
15.
policy

Chicago

issued

a commercial

umbrella

liability

(the "Chicago Policy") under which LaSal is the named

insured.

The Chicago Policy affords excess coverage above the

underlying Omaha Policy CL-000269 (R. 460). The Chicago Policy is
Policy No. 55C-2059706 and has a policy period from July 1, 1984 to
July 1, 1985 (R. 452-465).
16.

Under the "duty to defend" provision found in the

Omaha and Carriers Policies, Omaha and Carriers agreed to:
. . . defend any suit against the insured seeking
damages on account of such bodily injury or
property damage, even if any of the allegations of
the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent, . . .
(R. 2146, 2023.)
17.

The coverage provision in the Omaha and Carriers

Policies provides that the insurer:
. . . will pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to
pay as damages because of (a) bodily injury: or (b)
property damage; to which this insurance applies,
caused by an occurrence, . . .
(R. 2146, 2023.)
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18.

The term "occurrence" is defined in the Omaha Policy

as:
"Occurrence" means an accident including continuous
or repeated exposure to conditions, which results
in bodily injury or property damage neither
expected5 nor intended from the stand point of the
Insured.
R. 2128.)
19.

The Omaha Policy defines the term "property damage,"

as:
"Property damage" means: (1) physical injury to or
destruction of tangible property which occurs
during the policy period, including the loss of use
thereof at any time resulting therefrom; or (2)
loss of use of tangible property which has not been
physically injured or destroyed provided such loss
of use is caused by an occurrence during the policy
period.6
(R. 2128.)
20.

The term "bodily injury" is defined in the Omaha

Policy as:
"Bodily injury" means bodily injury. sickness or
disease sustained by any 7person which occurs during
the policy period, . . .
(R. 2128.)
21.

The

Omaha

and

Carriers

Policies

contains

following exclusion:
This insurance does not apply:
(f) to bodily injury or property damage arising
out of the discharge, disbursal, release or escape

The Carriers Policy does not define "occurrence."
The Carriers Policy does not define "property damage."
The Carriers Policy does not define "bodily injury."
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the

of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalies,
toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials
or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into
or upon land, the atmosphere or other water course
or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply
if such discharge, disbursal, release or escape is
sudden and accidental; . . .
(R. 2146, 2067)(emphasis added).
22.

By letter dated February 21, 1986, LaSal notified

Omaha of the possible gas leak from LaSal's underground storage
lines and of potential claims under Omaha's CGL policy (R. 28412842).
23.

In August 1987, Omaha agreed to underwrite certain

expenses in the investigation of the alleged leak from LaSal's
underground

storage

tanks

and

lines,

including

retention

of

EarthFax Engineering, Inc. and a drilling company, and retention of
an

accountant

inventories.

to

assist

LaSal

in

its

review

of

gasoline

Omaha also advised LaSal of certain reservations of

rights (R. 2858-2859).
24.

On or about June 18, 1987, LaSal filed a notice of

claim with the Guaranty Association, based on the CGL policy issued
by Carriers (R. 2850-2851).
25.

By letter dated June 22, 1987, the adjuster for the

Guaranty Association informed LaSal that the cutoff dates for
filing claims against Carriers had past and, accordingly, that
there was nothing the adjuster could do to aid LaSal (R. 2860).
26.

On July 6, 1987, notice of claim was sent by LaSal

directly to the liquidator for Carriers (R. 2863-2864). Carriers'
liquidator, by letter dated July 15, 1987, refused to accept
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LaSal's claim on the basis that the "underground leak" was not
sudden and accidental and, therefore, that it was excluded under
the pollution exclusion (R. 2865-2866) .
27.

By letter dated September 3, 1987, Omaha set forth

its position regarding its coverage obligation and duty to defend
obligation to LaSal (R. 2867-2868).
under

its

reservation

of

Omaha, per its agreement and

rights, paid

for

certain

services

performed for LaSal by EarthFax Engineering, Inc. and by Zimmerman
Well Service, Inc. Omaha declined to pay LaSal's total attorneys'
fees.

Rather, Omaha paid one-sixth of LaSal's attorneys' fees or

$1,275.14, incurred prior to September 3, 1987.
28.

In a letter dated December 28, 1988, counsel for

LaSal tendered defense of the Underlying Actions to Omaha and the
other primary carriers (R. 2876-2877).
29.

By letter dated February 3, 1989, Omaha declined

LaSal's tender of defense (R. 2905-2906).
30.

LaSal

received

no

response

from

the

Guaranty

Association regarding LaSal's tender of defense.
C.

The Release of Hydrocarbons at the LaSal Station.
31.

the

gasoline

The 1991 EarthFax Report concluded that the onset of
release

at

the

LaSal

Station

occurred

between

February, 1983 and September, 1984. The report further concluded
that gasoline would have reached the groundwater within a few days
(R. 1655-1656).
32.

Based on the 1991 EarthFax Report, LaSal asserted,

for purposes of argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment
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only, that damage to the environment in the form of hydrocarbon
pollution of the State's soils and groundwater resources would have
first occurred between February, 1983 and September, 1984 and, as
a consequence, fell within the Midland, Carriers and Omaha Policy
periods (R. 1633-1634).
33.

LaSal

asserted

that

the

trial

court

should,

therefore, hold that Midland, Carriers and Omaha had a duty to
defend LaSal in the State Action (R. 1636).
34.

The

1991

EarthFax

Report

also

concluded

that

contaminated groundwater from the LaSal Station would have arrived
at the southern boundary of the Ross plaintiffs' residential
properties no sooner than July, 1986.

Based on this estimate,

LaSal conceded that Omaha had no duty to defend LaSal in the Ross
action (R. 1655-1656; 1898, 1 19).
35.

Based on conclusions in the 1991 EarthFax Report,

LaSal further asserted that hydrocarbon contaminants would have
arrived at the Hartford Leasing Property (also known as the Moab
Regional Center) some time between approximately October-November,
1984 and July, 1986 (R. 1635-1636).
36.
the Hartford

As a result, LaSal contended that contamination of
Leasing

Property

occurred

Carriers or Omaha Policy periods.

some time during the

LaSal asked the court to hold

that Carriers and Omaha had a duty to defend LaSal in the Hartford
Action (R. 1636).
37.

After

reading

the parties memoranda

and

other

submissions, and hearing oral argument on the issues of the duty to
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defend and the duty to indemnify, the trial court requested that
LaSal and Omaha present expert testimony at an evidentiary hearing
to assist the court in deciding whether the five small holes found
in the underground transmission line on the west side of the LaSal
Station resulted in a "sudden" discharge of gasoline (R. 1898-1899,

38.

At the evidentiary hearing before the trial court on

December 17, 1992, LaSal presented testimony through two witnesses,
Ray Klepzig (the President of LaSal) and Dr. Charles Pitt, a Ph.D.
in Metallurgy. Omaha presented the testimony of Dr. Franklin Alex,
also a Ph.D. in Metallurgy (R. 1899, J 21).
39.

After analyzing the section of pipe which contained

the five small holes, Dr. Pitt drafted a report on his conclusions
as to whether the discharge of gasoline occurred suddenly.
report stated in part:
In my opinion the openings were caused by a sudden
failure of the metal at the thread roots.
The
sudden failure was due to over stress of the metal
from the interior pressure of the liquid gasoline
in the tank. Corrosion of the pipe wall produced a
situation where the metal thickness at the thread
roots was too small to hold the interior pressure.
At that point in time the thinned metal fractured
suddenly (due perhaps to a fluctuation of pressure
in the line) allowing gasoline to flow from the
opening produced by the metal failure. . . . From
information given by the station owner the interior
pressure in the pipe could have been as much as 45
psi.
The resulting calculation gives a metal
thickness of 1.1 mils at the time of failure.
Basically what will happen in a failure of this
type is that the metal will rupture suddenly due to
the interior stress at the thinnest area of the
metal. After rupture there may be corrosion at the
thin edge of the metal to further enlarge the
openings.
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The

R. 1885, Exhibit 3-P.
40.

According to Dr. Pitt/s testimony at the evidentiary

hearing, the section of pipe he examined was corroded in a number
of localized areas:
The corrosion proceeded to continue until at some
point in time the metal was thin enough to burst
suddenly from the inside pressure of the pipe.
. . .

The corrosion simply thinned the pipe to a point
where it failed at the thread root.
R. 3235, 3238-3239.
41.

It was Dr. Pitt's opinion that, prior to the instant

when the holes in the pipe formed, gasoline was moving through the
pipe with no leakage.

Once a hole appeared in the pipe, there

would be a release of gasoline to the environment (R. 3237-3239).
42.

In Dr. Pitt's opinion, the failure exhibited on the

pipe section probably occurred because of an increase in gasoline
pressure inside the pipe as, for example, when the gasoline pump
was turned on and the pressure inside the pipe went from 25-30 psi
to 40-45 psi (R. 3255).
43.

According to Dr. Pitt, the fracture moment, whether

due to corrosion or some form of external stress, is the same (R.
3239-3241).
44.
of pipe.

Dr. Alex, Omaha's expert, also analyzed the section

Dr. Alex, like Dr. Pitt, testified that prior to the

instant when a hole in the pipe formed, the line would hold
gasoline without leaking, whereas after failure of the pipe it
would immediately begin to leak:
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Q:

Now, before there was a failure in that piece
of pipe, before there was a failure, would it
hold water or gasoline?

A:

Yes, it would.

Q:

And after the failure it wouldn't hold water
or gasoline, right?

A:

That is correct.

Q:

And it's true, isn't it, that at one point in
time that piece of pipe would hold gasoline?
It was a good containment unit, right?

A:

That is correct.

Q:

And at some point in time it wasn't a good
containment unit, right?

A:

That is correct.

R. 3289.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The pollution

exclusion

in the Omaha

and

Carriers

Policies contains an exception for any "discharge, disbursal,
release or escape [which] is sudden and accidental." This Court in
Gridley Assoc. Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co.. 828 P.2d 524 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992) held that the term "sudden" found in the exception
to the pollution exclusion is unambiguous and that it has a
temporal element. Plaintiff requests that this Court reexamine the
issue as to whether "sudden" is unambiguous.
definitions, the

history

of

the

exception

Based on dictionary
to

the pollution

exclusion and the scope of the controversy among jurisdictions
concerning the exception to the pollution exclusion, it is clear
that the term "sudden" interpreted in conjunction with the term

- 21 -

"accidental"

is

reasonably

susceptible

to

more

interpretation, including "unintended or unexpected."

than

one

Because the

term is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the term must
be construed against Omaha and Carriers, and in favor of LaSal
since the release of gasoline at the LaSal Station was both
unexpected and unintended.
In the alternative, assuming that the term "sudden" is
unambiguous and that it has a temporal aspect, the release of
gasoline from the LaSal Station was nevertheless "sudden."

The

initial small opening in the underground line at the LaSal Station,
although caused by corrosive processes, materialized abruptly,
discharging gasoline immediately into the environment.

As this

Court recognized in Gridley, neither the length of time which
elapsed between this immediate release and the discovery of the
release nor the volume of the initial release is relevant as to
whether the release occurred "suddenly." The cause of the initial
release or fracture is equally irrelevant as to whether the release
occurred "suddenly."

Accordingly, because the discharge occurred

abruptly and instantaneously the release falls within the "sudden
and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
The Pollution Exclusion in the Omaha and Carriers Policies
is Ambiguous and Should, Therefore, be Construed
in Favor of LaSal.
This Court held in Gridley Assoc,, Ltd. v. Transamerica
Ins. Co. . 828 P.2d 524 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) that the term "sudden"
found in the exception to the pollution exclusion in a CGL policy
was unambiguous and that it had a temporal element.

The Court

should, however, reexamine the issue as to whether "sudden" is, in
fact, unambiguous.
other

jurisdictions

Subsequent to this Court's Gridley decision,
have

found

that

the

term

"sudden

and

accidental" is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation
and, as a result, must be interpreted in favor of coverage for the
insured.
It is well established that ambiguities in an insurance
contract must be resolved against the insurance company as drafter
of the language in question.

Fuller v. Director of Finance, 694

P.2d 1045 (Utah 1985); Utah Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Orville
Andrews & Son, 665 P.2d 1308, 1309 (Utah 1983); Williams v. First
Colony Life Ins. Co., 593 P.2d 534 (Utah 1979).

"[I]f an insurance

policy is ambiguous or uncertain, so that it is fairly susceptible
of different interpretations, any doubt should be resolved in favor
of insurance coverage."

American Casualty Co. of Redding. Pa. v.

Eagle Star Ins. Co. Ltd., 568 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1977). See

also,

Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Dennis, 645 P.2d 672, 674 (Utah
1982) .
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The phrase "sudden and accidental11 is not defined in the
Omaha or Carriers Policies.

Likewise, neither the word "sudden"

nor "accidental" are defined separately.

In the absence of a

definition set forth in an insurance policy, terms in that policy
are interpreted in light of their ordinary, commonly used meaning.
Drauahon v. CUNA Mutual Ins. Society, 771 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah Ct.
App.

1989).

Dictionary

"sudden" is susceptible to
primary

meaning

"happening

of

without

definitions

support the position

more than one reasonable meaning.

"sudden"

found

warning"

or

in

most

dictionaries

"unexpected."8

that
The
is

Dictionary

definitions are inconsistent, however, with respect to whether the
term "sudden" does or does not refer to duration;

8

Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1988) defines
"sudden" as: (1) happening or coming unexpected, changing angle or
character all at once; (2) marked by or manifesting abruptness or
haste; (3) made or brought about in a short time; an unexpected
occurrence; emergency.
The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary
(1971, reprinted 1981) defines "sudden" as: happening or coming
without warning or premonition; taking place or appearing all at
once.
In some contexts the implication is rather unexpected,
unforeseen, unlooked for or not prepared or provided for; (2) of a
turning, etc.: abrupt, sharp; (3) of physical objects: appearing
or discovered unexpectedly; (4) made, provided, or formed in a
short time; (5) prompt in action or effect, producing an immediate
result; (6) brief, momentary, lasting only a short time.
The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, (2d
ed. unabridged 1987) defines "sudden" as: (1) happening, coming,
made, or done quickly, without warning or unexpectedly: a sudden
attack; (2) occurring without transition from the previous form,
state, etc.; abrupt, a sudden turn; (3) impetuous; rash; (4)
unpremeditated; (5) and unexpected occasion or occurrence.
See additional definitions in Nancer Ballard and Peter M.
Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters, Anatomy of the Comprehensive General
Liability Pollution Exclusion, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 610, n. 11
(1990).
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Courts that have not carefully considered the
temporal nature of "sudden" have confused it with
brevity and have asserted that an event which does
not end quickly cannot be sudden. Certainly some
"sudden" events do end quickly, due to the physical
properties of the activity, such as a "sudden
shot." However, a shot into the air could still be
described as a "sudden shot" although the bullet
might travel for miles and an indeterminate period
of time. The dictionaries' various illustrations
of sudden events are not events that necessarily
end quickly. For example, Webster's New Twentieth
Century Dictionary. unabridged, illustrates the
meaning of sudden with the phrase "sudden
emergency." A sudden emergency is one which arises
abruptly and unexpectedly.
The duration of the
emergency is irrelevant to the concept. A "sudden
need" begins abruptly but need not end quickly.
Similarly, a "sudden attack," "sudden fear" and
"sudden resolve" may be of long or short duration.
Compare a "sudden recognition" of an old schoolmate
that may continue for one's life time with a
"sudden explosion" lasting less than a minute, and
a "sudden heat wave" which could last one day or
several weeks. In common usage, a "sudden" event
is one which begins abruptly or without previous
notice irrespective of whether the duration of that
event is short or long.
Nancer Ballard and Peter M. Manus, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 610 (1990)
(footnotes omitted).
In Just v. Land Reclamation. Ltd.. 456 N.W.2d 570 (Wis.
1990), the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the position advanced
by an insurer which argued that the only meaning for the word
"sudden" was abrupt or immediate. While acknowledging that "abrupt
or immediate" was certainly one common meaning, the court pointed
out that recognized dictionaries provided a range of meanings for
the term "sudden."

Id^ at 573.

The Just court also relied upon two additional lines of
reasoning in holding that the word "sudden" was ambiguous. First,
the court examined the history of the exception to the pollution
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exclusion

in order to determine the intent of the insurance

industry when it drafted the pollution exclusion at issue in 1973.
The Just court noted that according to various commentators, "the
exclusion was designed to decrease claims for losses caused by
expected

or

intended

pollution by providing

an

incentive to

industry to improve its manufacturing and disposal processes, and
unintentional or unexpected damages would still be covered as an
'occurrence' under the policy."

Id. at 574.

The insurance

industry also represented to state insurance commissioners that the
new exclusion continued coverage for pollution-caused injuries
resulting

from accidents, but excluded

coverage

resulting from expected or intended pollution. Id.

for injuries
(See extensive

discussion of the history of the pollution exclusion in Morton
Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Americaf 134 N.J. 1,
629 A.2d 831 (1993).
Second,

the

Just

court

reviewed

the

scope

of the

controversy among jurisdictions concerning the exception to the
pollution exclusion.

The Just court found that the extensive

debate over the meaning of the term "sudden" "dispels the insurer's
contention that the exclusionary language is clear."

Id. at 578.

The court concluded that the term "sudden" was, in fact, ambiguous
and, therefore, that the pollution exclusion must be interpreted in
favor of coverage.
Company,

See also,

Allstate Insurance Co. v. Klock Oil

73 A.D.2d 486, 426 N.Y.S.2d 603

(1980)("sudden" not

necessarily limited to an instantaneous happening); Claussen v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. , 259 Ga. 333, 380 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 1979)
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("sudden"

has

more

than

one

reasonable

meaning,

including

"unexpected"); Mapco Alaska Petroleum v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co. of
Omaha, 795 F.Supp. 941 (D. Alaska 1991)("the phrase 'sudden and
accidental5, as well as having a temporal meaning, can also refer
to that which occurs without notice"); Queens City Farms, Inc. v.
Central Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 64 Wash.App. 838, 827 P.2d 1024
(1992); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 154
111.2d 90, 607 N.E.2d 1204

(1992); Jov Technologies, Inc. v.

Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 187 W.Va. 742, 421 S.E.2d 493 (W.Va.
1992); Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 810 F.Supp.
1406

(D.Del. 1992)(under Connecticut law the term "sudden and

accidental"

was

reasonably

capable

of

two

widely

different

interpretations); Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 79 Ohio
App. 3d 183, 607 N.E.2d 28 (1992); New Castle County v. Hartford
Accident and Indemnity Co., 933 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1991)(the term
"sudden appears capable of two reasonable interpretations—"abrupt"
and "unexpected" and, therefore, is ambiguous under Delaware law) ;
Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo.
1991).
In the case now before this Court, Carriers and Omaha are
not relieved of their duty to defend or indemnify LaSal on the
basis of the exception to the pollution exclusion found in each of
their policies.

The "sudden and accidental" language in the

exception to the pollution exclusion is subject to at least two
reasonable, alternative interpretations.
interpreted

If the term "sudden" is

in conjunction with the term
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"accidental" to be

susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, one of
which is "unintended or unexpected," there is coverage.

There is

no evidence whatsoever that LaSal either expected or intended that
one of its underground lines would fracture, thereby releasing
gasoline

into

the

environment.

Indeed,

counsel

for

Omaha

acknowledged that the release was "accidental," and that LaSal
neither

intended

nor

expected

the

release

(R.

3143).

The

undisputed testimony of Ray Klepzig, the President of LaSal, is
that as soon as he suspected that there may have been a release of
gasoline, he took immediate steps to locate and repair LaSal's
lines and tanks (R. 3215-3223) . It was in LaSal's best interest to
assure that no releases of gasoline from its underground thanks and
lines occurred, and that if any fracture or opening did occur, it
be stopped as quickly as possible.
In sum, the exception to the pollution exclusion is
reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, including
"unexpected" and "unintended."

It must, therefore, be construed

against Omaha and Carriers, and in favor of LaSal to provide
coverage for the release of gasoline at the LaSal Station.
POINT II
Assuming That the Term "Sudden" Has a Temporal Aspect,
The Trial Court Nevertheless Erred in Holding That The Release
of Gasoline From LaSal's Underground Line Was Not "Sudden"
On

January

21,

1993, the

trial

court

issued

its

Memorandum Decision (R. 1886-1893) finding that the leak at the
LaSal Station "was not the result of a sudden occurrence," and,
accordingly, that no coverage was afforded LaSal under the Omaha
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Policy because of the exception to the pollution exclusion.

In so

holding, the trial court relied upon this Court's decision in
Gridley Assoc, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins* Co., 828 P.2d 524 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992) , as well as the trial court's own experience with
leaking pipes (R. 3296-3297).

In relying on Gridley, the court

noted that the Gridley court held that,
"The terms 'sudden and accidental' are unambiguous.
As commonly used, the meaning of sudden combines
both elements of without notice or warning and
quick or brief in time. . . . Sudden connotes a
'temporal
aspect
of
immediacy,
abruptness,
swiftness, quickness, instantaneous and brevity.'"
R. 1890, citing

Gridley et al. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 828 P.2d

at 527 (quoting U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Morrison Grain Co.,
734 F.Supp. 437, 446 (D.Kan. 1990).9
The

trial

court,

also

following

Gridley,

properly

recognized that the length of time which elapses between the
commencement of a release and the discovery of the release "does
not render the fracture any less sudden."

The trial court also

recognized that the amount of discharge was irrelevant as to
whether the discharge was sudden (R. 1891). According to the trial
court, the only fact distinguishing this case from Gridley is that
the fracture in the pipe in Gridley was a "clean break," apparently
caused by ground adjustment, whereas the point of release in
LaSal/s pipe was caused by corrosion.
9

Because the force(s) which

Recent Tenth Circuit decisions, Anaconda Minerals Co. v.
Stoeler Chemical Co., 990 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1993) and Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co., 962 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1992), have
upheld the trial court's determination that under Utah law "sudden"
is unambiguous and has a temporal aspect. Both cases involved
continuous, routine discharges of pollutants on industrial sites.
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caused the fracture in the Gridley pipe were different from those
which

caused

the

fracture

in LaSal's pipe, the trial court

concluded that the discharge of gasoline from the underground
transmission line at the LaSal Station was not "sudden," According
to the trial court, "[t]he convincing evidence is that a leak
caused by corrosion is not sudden and accidental."
This perceived distinction is based on dicta

(R. 1891).

in Gridley wherein the

Court noted that there was,
[n]o evidence . . . that the break was caused by
corrosion or deterioration which would have
resulted in a gradual drip or trickle of gasoline
from the line. The clean break certainly resulted
in an unexpected as well as an immediate and abrupt
flow of gasoline from the severed line every time
the pump was activated.
Id. at 527.
A.

The Volume of Pollutants Released and the Length of Time
Between the Onset of a Release and Its Discovery Are
Irrelevant as to Whether a Release Is "Sudden".
In

Gridleyf

this

Court

adopted

the

position

that

"'sudden' has a plain, unambiguous meaning. While the word sudden
connotes a sense of unexpectedness, * sudden' within the 'sudden and
accidental' clause
temporal

element,

quickness."

cannot be defined without
specifically

immediacy,

reference to a
abruptness,

and

Id. at 527 (footnotes omitted).

The Gridley court's interpretation of the term "sudden"
as having

a temporal

element

explicitly

recognizes

that the

exception to the pollution exclusion merely requires that the
discharge itself be sudden in order for there to be coverage and,
as a result, that the length of time which elapses between the
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initiation of the release and its discovery is irrelevant as to the
"suddenness" of the release.

The term "sudden," however, should

not be confused with "brevity."

As stated by the New Jersey

Supreme Court in Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of
America. 134 N.J. 1, 629 A.2d 831 (1993):
Certainly some "sudden" events do end quickly, due
to the physical properties of the activity, such as
a "sudden shot." A sudden emergency is one which
arises abruptly and unexpectedly. The duration of
the emergency is irrelevant to the concept.
A
"sudden need" begins abruptly but need not end
quickly.
Similarly, a "sudden attack," "sudden
fear," and "sudden resolve" may be of long or short
duration. Compare a "sudden recognition" of an old
schoolmate that may continue for one's lifetime
with a "sudden explosion" lasting less than a
minute and a "sudden heat wave" which could last
one day or several weeks.
In common usage, a
"sudden" event is one which begins abruptly or
without previous notice, irrespective of whether
the duration of that event is short or long.
Id. at 871-872, citing
Waters:

N. Ballard and P. Manus, Clearing Muddy

Anatomy of the Comprehensive General Liability Pollution

Exclusion, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 610 (1990).
Other jurisdictions have also recognized that the term
"sudden" refers to the initial release of pollutants and not to the
duration of the release.

In Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety

Co., 259 Ga. 333, 380 S.E.2d 686 (1979), the court recognized that
various definitions of "sudden" include both "abrupt" and "coming
or occurring unexpectedly."

The court stated,

On reflection one realizes that, even in the
popular usage, "sudden" does not usually describe
the duration of an event, but rather its
unexpectedness: a sudden storm, a sudden turn in
the road, sudden death. Even when used to describe
the onset of an event, the word has an elastic
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temporal connotation that varies with expectations:
Suddenly, it's spring.
Id. at 688. Thus, the Claussen court held that under common usage,
"sudden" has a temporal element of abrupt or unexpected onset, but
did not necessarily mean brevity.
Similarly,

in

Lumbermens

Mutual

Casualty

Co.

v.

Belleville Industries. Inc., 407 Mass. 675, 555 N.E.2d 568 (Mass.
1990), cert,

denied,

U.S.

, 112 S.Ct. 969 (1992), the

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered a certified
question from the United States District Court regarding the proper
interpretation of the "sudden and accidental" exception to the
pollution exclusion clause of a CGL policy. The Lumbermens court,
in holding that the term "sudden" had a temporal element, reasoned
that the sudden event to which the exception to the pollution
exclusion applied was the release of pollutants, and not to the
cause of the release or the damage caused by the release.

Id. at

571. "Surely, the abruptness of the commencement of the release or
discharge of the pollutant is the crucial element."

Id. at 572.

In Wagner v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co., 145 Wis.2d
609, 427 N.W.2d 854 (Wis.Ct.App. 1988); overruled on other grounds,
Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd. , 155 Wis.2d 737, 456 N.W.2d 570
(Wis. 1990) , the court found that a release of gasoline from an
underground storage tank was both temporally sudden and accidental.
Although the record did not establish the exact cause of the leak,
the evidence indicated that it occurred three years before its
discovery.

According to the court, the fact that three years had

elapsed between the date of the initial release and the discovery
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of the leak was irrelevant to determining whether the event itself
was "sudden."

The court stated:

The gasoline began leaking immediately after the
pipe was damaged in 1981, and continued to leak
until it was discovered in 1984. Without question
there was an immediate discharge of gasoline into
the ground; it just took several years for the
gasoline to migrate to a point where it could be
detected. The length of time that elapsed before
the leak was discovered is irrelevant as to the
suddenness of the discharge.
427 N.W.2d at 857.
The Wagner court also rejected the insurance company's
position that a pipe which leaked for three years was not "sudden"
on the basis that if followed to its logical conclusion, the
argument was unreasonable:
Milwaukee Mutual admitted at oral argument that
even were the pipe to be damaged accidentally, only
the quantity of pollutants released immediately
following the property damage would meet the
requirement that the discharge be "sudden."
We
believe that no reasonable distinction can be made
between an accident that causes an immediate
discharge of pollutants in great amounts and one
that creates a leak permitting great amounts of
pollutants to accumulate over time. Interpreting
the contract language to make such a distinction
would place an unreasonable and insurmountable
burden on an insured. The insured would be forced
to show that the damage for which he or she is
liable resulted from the initial discharge as
opposed to that occurring later in time. We refuse
to construe the language of an insurance policy to
effectuate an unreasonable result.
Id. See also,

Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co.. 12 Cal.

App. 4th 715, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 815, 841-842 (1993) ("' sudden'
refers to the pollution's commencement and does not require that
the polluting

event terminate quickly

or have only

a brief

duration"); Goodman v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.. 412 Mass. 807,
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593 N.E.2d 233 (1992) (crucial element in determining whether an
event is "sudden" is the abruptness of the commencement of the
release of the pollutant); Petr-All Petroleum Corp, v. Fireman's
Ins. Co,, 593 N.Y.S.2d

693

(N. Y. App.Div. 1993)

(leak from a

subsurface pipe that continues undetected for a period of time is
both sudden and accidental); Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident
Ins. Co. of America, 134 N.J. 1, 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993) ("the
duration of the event—whether it lasts an instant, a week, or a
month—is not necessarily relevant to whether the inception of the
event is sudden").

Colonie Motors, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and

Indemnity Co., 538 N.Y.S.2d 630, 632 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (The
initial discharge of waste oil from a containment tank was "sudden
and accidental."

"The fact that the discharge was not readily

discoverable and, thus, continued for a period of time, through no
fault

of

the

insured,

should

not move an otherwise

covered

occurrence within the rather shadowy perimeter of the exclusion.")
Because the length of time that the release remains
undetected is irrelevant, it follows that the volume of pollutants
which escapes into the environment during the period when the
release

remains

undetected

is

equally

irrelevant

to

the

"suddenness" of the release. Wagner v. Milwaukee Mutual Ins. Co.,
427 N.W.2d 854 (Wis.Ct.App. 1988), overruled

on other

grounds;

Just

v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis.2d 737, 456 N.W.2d 570 (Wis.
1990). Hence, Judge Rokich in the instant case properly found that
"the amount of discharge does not render the fracture any less
sudden."

(R. 1891.)
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This Court recognized in Gridley that the amount of
pollutants which escape prior to detection is irrelevant to the
suddenness of the release, stating:
For instance, if an accident causes a break in a
very large oil line in a remote area which spills
large amounts of oil onto the ground, the fact that
the oil spill remains undetected for a period of
time does not render the discharge of oil any less
"sudden." Accordingly, in the case at bar, where
there was damage to a line which caused an
immediate spill of gasoline into the ground that
remained undiscovered by Gridley for some months,
the discharge itself was still "sudden" as
contemplated by the exception to the pollution
exclusion.
Id. at 527-528.
The exception to the pollution exclusion does not contain
any reference to volume.

If the exception were intended to have a

volume threshold in order to trigger coverage, then the exception
should explicitly state that such a threshold must exist.

Any

volume threshold, furthermore, would be impracticable because that
threshold would have to be tied to specific pollutants.

This

necessarily follows for the reason that certain pollutants, even in
minute quantities, may disperse rapidly, causing immediate bodily
injury or property damage, whereas other pollutants may require
significant volumes before bodily injury or property damages occur.
In addition, to hold that the volume of pollutants
released is relevant to determining whether the release was "sudden
and accidental" would lead to anomalous results.
suppose

that

two

For example,

insureds each releases the same amount of

pollutants into the ground. The first insured, in the few moments
after a large rupture of his underground tank or line, discharges
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hundreds of gallons of pollutants into the ground and continues to
do so at a lesser rate for a period of months or years. Assume, on
the other hand, that the second insured has a very small hole in an
underground
pollutants

tank

or pipe which releases

during the

first moment

only

one gallon of

and continues to release

pollutants at that same rate for a period of years, so that the
volume of pollutants released by the first insured with the large
rupture is the same as that released by the second insured with the
small hole.

If the volume of release were relevant to whether the

release was "sudden," the first insured would have insurance
coverage under the exception to the pollution exclusion whereas the
second insured with the small fracture would have no coverage,
despite the fact that each insured releases the same amount of
pollutants to the environment.

Furthermore, to require that an

insured be able to quantify the initial release in order to fall
within

the

exception

to

the

pollution

insurmountable burden on the insured.

exclusion

places

an

In the vast majority of

cases, the measurement of volume of pollutants at the initial
release would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine.
The Gridley court, in holding that the break in the line
at issue resulted in a "sudden and accidental" release to the
environment, relied in part upon the reasoning found in Wagner v.
Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co. . 145 Wis.2d 609, 427 N.W.2d 854
(Wis.Ct.App. 1988), overruled

on other

grounds,

Just v. Land

Reclamation. Ltd., 155 Wis.2d 737, 456 N.W.2d 570 (Wis. 1990).
Gridley quotes Wagner with approval as standing the for proposition
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that, " [t]he length of time that elapsed before the leak was
discovered is irrelevant as to the suddenness of the discharge."
Gridley Assoc., Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 828 P.2d at 527.
The Wagner court further concluded that, "[w]e believe . . . no
reasonable distinction can be made between an accident that causes
an immediate discharge of pollutants in great amounts and one that
creates

a

leak

permitting

accumulate over time."
427 N.W.2d at 857.

a

great

amount

of

pollutants

to

Wagner v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co..

Thus it follows, both from the reasoning in

Wagner and from the hypothetical example in Gridley, that neither
the volume released nor the length of time which elapses before
discovery of the release are relevant to the suddenness of the
release. The only logical conclusion that may be drawn is that the
amount of the initial release, that is, the amount of pollutants
released

in the first moment when the containment vessel is

breached, must also be irrelevant as to whether a discharge is
"sudden and accidental."
The trial court in the instant case properly recognized
that neither the volume of pollutants released nor the amount of
time which passed before detection of the release were relevant to
whether there was a "sudden and accidental" release of pollutants
(R. 1891). This Court should affirm the trial court's finding that
neither the volume of gasoline released at the LaSal Station nor
the length of time which transpired between initiation of the
release and its discovery are relevant to determining whether the
release was "sudden and accidental."
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B.

The Fact That the Release From LaSal's Underground Line
was Due to Corrosion Is Irrelevant as to Whether The
Release Was "Sudden."
The trial court below distinguished Gridley on the basis

that the break at issue in Gridley was a "clean break" whereas
LaSal's break was due to corrosion.

"The convincing evidence is

that a leak caused by corrosion is not sudden and accidental."
1891.)

(R.

The perceived factual difference between Gridley and the

case now before this Court is, for purposes of interpreting "sudden
and accidental/1 a distinction without meaning.

The only event

which need be sudden in order to fall within the exception to the
pollution exclusion is the initial release.

The exception to the

pollution exclusion does not require that the cause of the release
be

sudden.

Lumbermens

Mutual

Casualty

Co.

v.

Belleville

Industries. Inc.. 407 Mass 675, 555 N.E.2d 568 (1990), cert,
U.S.

denied

, 112 S.Ct. 969 (1992) (the exception to the pollution

exclusion applies to the release of pollutants, not to the cause of
the release).

In fact, the exception is silent as to cause.

If

Omaha and Carriers wished to exclude releases due to corrosion they
could easily have done so. Corrosion exclusions are commonplace in
certain types of insurance policies10 and could have been inserted
in the exception to the pollution exclusion found in LaSal's CGL
policies had Omaha and Carriers intended to except sudden and
accidental discharges due to corrosion.

10

See, e.g.. Arkwricrht-Boston Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Wausau Paper Mills Co.. 818 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1987).
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Judicial

construction

of

the

phrase

"sudden

and

accidental" in the context of other types of insurance policies,
such as, boiler and machinery policies, supports the proposition
that "sudden" does not refer to the cause of the release.

In

Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co, v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co,,
53 Wash.2d 404, 333 P.2d 938 (1959), for example, the boiler and
machinery policy at issue covered a large band saw. Covered losses
were defined in the policy as those "occasioned by an accident,
defined as the sudden and accidental breaking of the band saw
wheel, or any part thereof, into two or more separate parts while
it was in use or connected for use." Id. at 939. The saw began to
vibrate in an abnormal manner, and the insured took it out of
service.

It was only when the wheel to the band saw was removed

that the insured discovered that one spoke was cracked all the way
through and another was partially cracked.

The insured's expert

testified that the fracture was a fatigue-type break, attributable
to a flaw in the original casting.
that

The expert further testified

"there was a gradual cracking, extending through three-

quarters of the broken spoke, which must have occurred over a
period from one to three weeks but that the breaking of the last
quarter was instantaneous."

Id. at 940. The defendant insurance

company argued that the breaking or cracking was a gradual process
which extended over an unknown period of time and, therefore, that
the accident did not occur "suddenly."
The trial court in Anderson & Middleton Lumber rejected
the insurer's argument and concluded that the break was "sudden"
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within the meaning of the policy.

The Supreme Court of Washington

affirmed, noting that there was no indication in the policy that
the policy was not meant to cover breakage resulting from either
latent defects or from fatigue.

"It is only contended that the

result, in order to be within the coverage of the policy, must have
happened instantaneously."

Id. at 941.

Similarly, in Julius Hyman & Co. v. American Motorists
Ins. Co. . 136 F.Supp 830 (D. Colo. 1955), the insurance policy
covered "sudden" breaks in machinery and pipes.
boiler

pipe

appeared

instantaneously

after

An opening in a
gradual

internal

restriction of the pipe occurred over an unknown period of time
which caused the pipe to split at its weakest point. The court
found that "[t]he pressure from within, when the strength of the
pipe so decreased as not to be able to withstand it, split the pipe
at its weakest point," thereby permitting certain chemicals to
escape.

The court further found that "this involved a sudden and

accidental tearing asunder of the pipe," and not a gradual process
that would preclude coverage if the break were not sudden and
accidental.

Id. at 832-833.

As noted by the New Jersey Supreme

Court in Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of
America, 134 N.J. 1, 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993):
The most significant aspect of the boiler-andmachinery policy cases lies in the Washington
Supreme Court's observation that from the insurers
standpoint little if any justification existed for
distinguishing between breaks in machinery that
occurred instantaneously and those that resulted
from gradual wear but were undetectable: "it seems
to us that the risk to the insurer would be the
same whether a break was instantaneous or began
with a crack which developed over a period of time
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until the final cleavage occurred, as long as its
progress was undetectable."
Id. at 865, citing

Anderson and Middleton Lumber Co. v. Lumbermen's

Mutual Casualty Co., 53 Wash.2d 404, 333 P.2d 938, 940 (Wash.
1959).
In the case now before this Court, there can be little
question that the release of pollutants from the underground
transmission line at the LaSal Station was "sudden."

The trial

court's focus on the cause of the release, namely, corrosion, and
the fact that corrosion is a long-term process was misplaced.
concentrating

on the process which

By

led to the break in the

underground line, rather than the release itself, the trial court
ignored the crucial point that the initial release of gasoline to
the environment was nevertheless "sudden."

The fact that the

initial release may have involved only small quantities of gasoline
is, by this Court's and the trial court's reasoning, irrelevant
because the volume of release is irrelevant to the suddenness of
the release.

Regrettably, the trial court failed to follow its

reasoning to its logical conclusion; that is, that if the volume of
release is irrelevant to the suddenness of the release, the fact
that only minute quantities of gasoline may have been initially
released is irrelevant to the release's "suddenness."
As noted, supra

pp. 29-30, the trial court's reasoning

that a release cause by corrosion cannot be sudden was based in
part on dicta

in Gridlev, wherein this Court distinguished between

the "clean break" in the case before it and a hypothetical break
due to corrosion.

The fractured pipe in Gridley was simpler
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factually than the facts surrounding LaSal's release of gasoline.
The Gridlev Court did not directly address the issue of whether a
release—whether caused by a corrosive process or a more dramatic
and instantaneous process—has the same result: a sudden or abrupt
opening in a containment vessel from which there is an immediate
release

of

pollutants.

The

statement

in Gridlev

regarding

corrosion could not have been intended by this Court to be the
final word on whether a corrosive process can lead to a "sudden and
accidental" release from an underground line.
In the instant case, the section of LaSal's pipe with the
five small holes was analyzed by two experts.

Dr. Pitt, LaSal's

expert, stated in his report:
In my opinion the openings were caused by a sudden
failure of the metal at the thread roots.
The
sudden failure was due to over stress of the metal
from the interior pressure of the liquid gasoline
in the tank. Corrosion of the pipe wall produced a
situation where the metal thickness at the thread
roots was too small to hold the interior pressure.
At that point in time the thinned metal fractured
suddenly (due perhaps to a fluctuation of pressure
in the line) allowing gasoline to flow from the
opening produced by the metal failure. . . . From
information given by the station owner the interior
pressure in the pipe could have been as much as 45
psi.
The resulting calculation gives a metal
thickness of 1.1 mils at the time of failure.
Basically what will happen in a failure of this
type is that the metal will rupture suddenly due to
the interior stress at the thinnest area of the
metal. After rupture there may be corrosion at the
thin edge of the metal to further enlarge the
openings.
R. 1885, Exhibit 3-P.
According to Dr. Pitt, the process of corrosion "simply
thinned the pipe to a point where it failed at the thread root."
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(R. 3235, 3238-3239.)

The failure exhibited on the pipe section

with the five holes probably occurred because of an increase in
gasoline pressure as, for example, when the gasoline pump was
turned on and the pressure inside the transmission pipe went from
25-30 psi to 40-45 psi (R. 3255).

The fracture moment, according

to Dr. Pitt, whether due to corrosion or to some other process, is
the same:

prior to the instant when the first hole in the pipe

appeared, gasoline was moving through an intact pipe with no
leakage.

Once the hole appeared

in the pipe, gasoline was

immediately released to the environment (R. 3237-3241).
Dr. Alex, Omaha's expert, concurred with Dr. Pitt's
opinion that prior to the instant when the initial hole appeared in
the pipe, the line held gasoline without leaking whereas after
failure of the pipe, it immediately began to leak (R. 3289).

The

fact that the initial release may have involved only very small
quantities of gasoline is irrelevant to the fact that the release,
when it occurred, occurred suddenly.
CONCLUSION
If the term "sudden" is interpreted in conjunction with
the term "accidental" to be susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation—one of which is "unintended or unexpected"—the
release of gasoline at the LaSal Station falls within the exception
to the pollution exclusion. This follows because it is undisputed
that the release of gasoline was accidental and that LaSal neither
intended nor expected the release.

- 43

Because the exception to the

pollution exclusion is reasonably susceptible to more than one
interpretation, it must be construed against Omaha and Carriers,
and in favor of LaSal to provide coverage for the release of
gasoline.
The release of gasoline at the LaSal Station occurred
"suddenly."

The

initial

small

opening,

although

caused

by

corrosive processes, materialized abruptly, discharging gasoline
immediately into the environment. The length of time which elapsed
between this immediate discharge of gasoline and the discovery of
the gasoline plume is irrelevant for determining whether the
polluting event occurred
released

is

irrelevant

"suddenly."
as

to

whether

The volume of gasoline
the

release

occurred

"suddenly."

The process whereby the initial fracture or hole

appeared

irrelevant

is

"suddenly."

as

to

whether

the

release

occurred

The critical event, that is, the discharge itself,

occurred abruptly and

instantaneously.

Accordingly,

coverage

exists under the Omaha and Carriers Policies. The gasoline release
falls within the "sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution
exclusion.

This Court should hold that both Omaha and Carriers

have a duty to defend and to indemnify LaSal in the State Action
and the Hartford Action.

- 44 -

DATED this 27th day of October, 1993.

J^ MICHAEL HANSEN, Esq.
/
CLAUDIA F. BERRY, Esq.
'
of and for
SUITTER AXLAND & HANSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
LaSal Oil Company, Inc.

CFB34.55

- 45 "

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused two (2) true and correct
copies of the above and foregoing Brief of Petitioner/Appellant to
be mailed, U.S. mail, postage pre-paid thereon, this 27th day of
October, 1993, to the following:
Scott W. Christensen, Esq.
Mark J. Williams, Esq.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
Post Office Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah
84110-2970
Attorneys for Omaha Indemnity
Tim Dalton Dunn, Esq.
Carlton R. Ericson, Esq.
DUNN & DUNN
230 South 500 East, Suite 460
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Utah Property and Casualty
Insurance Guarantee Association
Robert G. Gilchrist, Esq.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
50 South Main, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
Attorneys for Chicago Insurance Company
Wallace R. Lauchnor, Esq.
PAULSEN, LAUCHNOR & MICKELSON
CSB Tower, Suite 500
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Attorneys for Chicago Insurance Company
Donald V. Jernberg, Esq.
Orest Dachniwsky, Esq.
OPPENHEIMER, WOLFF & DONNELLY
Two Illinois Center
233 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 2400
Chicago, Illinois 60601
Attorneys for Chicago Insurance Company

- 46 -

Allan T. Brinkerhoff, Esq.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Attorneys for Zurich Insurance Company

CFB34.55

- 47 -

JAN 2 1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LaSAL OIL COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs#

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CIVIL NO.

880907028

s

ALLIANZ INSURANCE COMPANY,
et a1

-'

utah

FILED
Court of Appeals

:

OCT 2 8 1993

f

Defendants.

An evidentiary hearing was held on December 17, 1992 ,"vto'
resolve the issues raised by plaintiff's Motion for Partial Sumitiary
Judgment

and the Motion of defendant Omaha Indemnity Company

(MOmaha,f) for Summary Judgment.
Michael Hansen.

The plaintiff was represented by

Omaha was represented by Mark J. Williams.

The parties submitted memoranda and pertinent cases in support
of their respective claims, presented expert testimony and orally
argued the merits of their case.
The

Court

has

given

due

consideration

to

all

of

the

information presented to it and is now ready to enter its ruling.
FACTS
Plaintiff is a corporation that owned a service station in
Moab since 1977 which it operated or leased to other parties.
Sometime in the mid-1970's, property owners and employees in
the immediate area were complaining of gas fumes.
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It was subsequently determined that the gas fumes originated
from plaintiff's service station.
Civil actions have been filed against plaintiff, and as a
result

of

these

actions plaintiff

is seeking

to

compel

its

insurance carriers to defend plaintiff in the civil actions.
INSURANCE COVERAGE
Omaha and plaintiff entered into an insurance contract wherein
Omaha would provide coverage for certain occurrences.
The insurance policy contained the following exclusionary
provision:
This insurance does not apply:
(f) to bodily injury or property damage arising out of
the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke,
vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalies, toxic chemicals,
liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants,
contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the
atmosphere or other water course or body of water; but
this exclusion does not apply if such discharge,
dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental... •
ISSUI
Plaintiff contends that the gasoline discharged from its gas
line was

sudden

and

accidental; therefore Omaha

must extend

coverage for damages that may result from the discharge.
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Omaha contends that the discharge of gasoline did not result
from a sudden and accidental discharge, therefore coverage should
not be extended to plaintiff.
ANALYSIS
The Court having read the memoranda and hearing oral argument
on the issue concluded that in the interest of establishing a basis
for its decision, the Court should have the benefit of expert
testimony on when a leak in a small metal pipe is sudden or not
sudden.
The Court called to the attention of counsel that it had a
considerable amount of experience with leaking water pipes caused
by corrosion and accidents.

Prior to becoming a Judge, the Court

had represented a water company for a number of years and owned
property where waterline leaks occurred frequently.

However, the

Court's decision is based upon the record made by the respective
parties.
Plaintiff and Omaha each presented

very well-qualified

experts to testify on the properties of small metal pipes used for
the transmission of gasoline from a storage tank to the gas pump.
The transmission line was comparatively short, but was subjected to
pressure of 25 psi to 45 psi when in use.
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Dr. Pitt testified that, "corrosion of the pipe wall produced
a situation where the metal thickness at the thread roots were too
small to hold the interior pressure.

At a point in time, the thin

metal fractured suddenly. . . allowing gasoline to flow from the
opening produced by the metal failure.11
Omaha's expert witness, Dr. Franklin Alex, testified that
corrosion caused a penetration of the pipe. Dr. Alex

stated that

corrosion started as soon as the pipe was laid in the ground and
the process of corrosion was dependent upon the corrosivity.of the
environment.
Dr. Alex

explained to the Court that the leak that occurred

in plaintiff's gas line was the result of corrosion which took
place over a lengthy period of time.

Dr. Alex stated that

corrosive leaks at the inception are minute and generally begin
with seepage and the amount of liquid that escapes from the line is
increased as the corrosion progresses.
The Court is of the opinion that both Dr. Pitt and Dr. Alex
would agree that in the corrosive process, exclusive of wear and
tear, it makes no difference if the metal pipe was a conduit for
fluid, because in

due time corrosion will cause the wall of the

pipe to be penetrated.

If there is fluid in the line, the
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penetration will probably be discovered sooner, but the amount of
discharge in and of itself doesn't mean that the leak was sudden.
Dr. Pitt takes the position that any penetration, even if it
is molecular, is sudden; whereas Dr. Alex claims that a corrosioncaused leak is not sudden.

In order for the Court to resolve the

issue as to when a penetration is or is not sudden, the Court
reviewed all of the cases submitted by counsel, and concluded that
the

recent

Utah

case

of

Gridley

Associates,

Ltd.

Petroleum

Management, Inc. and Vernon E. W. Dickman v. Transamerica Insurance
Company,

828 P.2d 524 (Utah 1992), is the case that best defines

what constitutes a sudden and accidental discharge.
Judge Russon, in his opinion stated that, "the terms 'sudden
and accidental' are unambiguous. As commonly used, the meaning of
sudden combines both elements of without notice or warning and
quick or brief in time. . . . Sudden connotes a 'temporal aspect
of immediacy, abruptness, swiftness, quickness, instantaneous and
brevity.'M
Judge Russon went on to state that sudden within the nsudden
and accidental11 clause cannot be defined without reference to a
temporal
quickness.

element,

specifically,

immediacy,

abruptness

and

LaSAL OIL V. ALLIANZ INS.

PAGE SIX

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Omaha argues that the Court should consider the amount of
discharge from the fractured line and the length of time that has
elapsed from the time of the leak to the time of discovery in
making its determination whether the leak was sudden.

There is

some authority for this view, but this Court adopts the position
taken by Judge Russon that length of time that elapses before the
leak is discovered or the amount of discharge does not render the
fracture any less sudden.
The Court recognizes that the Gridlev case, on the facts, is
distinguishable from this case. The facts in the Gridlev case are
such that the only conclusion that could be reached is that the
break was sudden. In this case, there is the corrosion factor that
adds another dimension to the analysis of whether the break,
fracture or leak is sudden.
The convincing evidence is that a leak caused by corrosion is
not sudden and accidental.
Since the leak was not the result of a sudden occurrence, the
exclusionary provision of the Omaha policy is applicable and
coverage need not be extended to plaintiff.
At the time the Court announced its decision from the bench as
to whether or not the leak in the gas line was not a sudden
occurrence, it explained to counsel that the Court was not
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Judgment, but was entering a Judgment in

conformance with the evidence presented.
Counsel

for

Omaha

shall

prepare

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in accordance with this Decision.
Dated this

<? '0 day of January, 1993.

JOHN A. ROKICH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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LaSal Oil Company, Inc.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.
Allianz Insurance Company;
Carriers Insurance Company;
Chicago Insurance Company;
(Interstate Insurance Group);
Midland Insurance Company;
Omaha Indemnity (Frank B.
Hall); Pacific Employers
Insurance Company (CIGNA);
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Zurich Insurance Company;
and Utah Property & Casualty
Insurance Guaranty Association,

Civil No. 88 0907028CV
Judge John A. Rokich

Defendants.
An evidentiary hearing was held on December 17# 1992, to
resolve the issues raised by plaintiff LaSal Oil Company, Inc.'s
("LaSal") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the Motion of
Defendant Omaha Indemnity Company ("Omaha") for Summary Judgment.
LaSal was represented by J. Michael Hansen and Claudia F. Berry.
Omaha was represented by Mark J. Williams.
previously

submitted Memoranda,

The parties had

and in conjunction

with the

evidentiary hearing, presented expert testimony and oral argument

on the merits of the case.
the Court, having

Because of such evidentiary hearing,

given due consideration

to the pleadings,

memoranda and testimony presented to it, issues the following
findings of fact:
1. LaSal has owned a certain gasoline service station located
at 322 South Main, Moab, Utah, since 1977 (the MLaSal Station").
From 1979 until June 1987, LaSal leased the station to third
parties. At all other times, LaSal has operated the station.
2.

Omaha issued a comprehensive general liability ("CGL")

policy of insurance under which LaSal was one of the named
insureds, policy no. CL000269 (the "Policy"), with a policy period
from July 1, 1984 to July 1, 1985.
3.

Sometime in the mid-1970s, fumes were detected on a

sporadic basis in the basement of the First Western National Bank
Building located on the northwest corner of 300 South and Main
Street, Moab, Utah, but neither the source nor the type of fumes
was ascertained.
4.

In approximately September 1982, a substantial leak of

gasoline occurred at the Stars Service Station owned by Rio Vista
Oil, Ltd. (the "Stars Station"), which is located east of the LaSal
property on the southeast corner of the intersection at 300 South
and Main Street, Moab, Utah. An investigation disclosed a heavily
corroded underground metal pipe used for transmission of gasoline
from storage tanks to the gasoline dispensers.
5.

According to expert testimony, the First National Bank

Building is downgradient from the Stars Station.
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6.

In approximately December 1985, complaints of gasoline

fumes were received by the Southeastern Utah Health District# Moab,
Utah, from tenants in the Walker Drug-Medical Center building.
Said building is located to the north of# and across the street
from, the LaSal Station.
7. During January, 1986, Ray Klepzig, President of LaSal, was
notified of gasoline fumes in the area of the LaSal Station and
undertook an investigation of the underground gasoline tanks and
lines located on the LaSal Station property.
8.

As a result of the investigation, three holes were

discovered in the coupling threads of one length of steel pipe
located on the west side of the LaSal Station.

The pipe was used

for the transmission of gasoline from the underground storage tanks
to the dispensers at the LaSal Station.
9. The underground gasoline transmission lines were subjected
at all times to pressure of approximately 25 pounds per square inch
("psi"). When the gasoline dispensers were activated the gasoline
transmission lines were subjected to 40 to 45 psi of pressure.
10. On or about December 7, 1987, the State of Utah served an
Order to Abate on LaSal alleging that LaSal was responsible for
discharging gasoline to the soil and groundwater and requiring,
inter alia, LaSal to halt the spread of any further gasoline in the
waters of the state and to submit and initiate a plan of corrective
action (the "State Action").
11.

On or about March 29, 1988, a civil action entitled

Arthur Ross, et al. v. LaSal Oil Co,, et al.. was filed in the
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Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Grand County, Utah, as
civil no. 5660 (the "Ross Plaintiffs' Suit"), wherein certain
homeowners residing northwesterly from the LaSal Station claimed
that gasoline fumes which originated at the LaSal Station entered
their homes.
12. On or about June 3, 1988, the owners of another building
northwest of the LaSal Station filed a lawsuit entitled Hartford
Leasing Corp. v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., Lasalle rsic] Oil Company,
State of Utah, Dependable Janitorial Service and John Does I
through X, civil no. 5692, filed in the Seventh Judicial District
Court in and for Grand County, Utah (the "Hartford Suit").
13.

Thereafter, LaSal tendered to Omaha the defense of the

State Action, the Ross Plaintiffs' Suit and the Hartford Suit
(collectively referred to as the "Underlying Actions"), which was
refused by Omaha.
14.

LaSal filed this declaratory judgment action against

Omaha and other of its insurers seeking defense costs arising from
and indemnification against the Underlying Actions.
15.

Omaha filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a

determination by this Court that it had no duty under its Policy to
defend or indemnify LaSal from or against any of the Underlying
Actions.
16. LaSal filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking
an Order that Omaha and the other insurance defendants had a duty
to pay LaSal's defense costs incurred in the Underlying Actions.
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17.

The Omaha Policy contains the following exclusionary

provision known as the "pollution exclusion":
This insurance does not apply:
(f) to bodily injury or property damage arising out of
the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke,
vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalies, toxic chemicals,
liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants,
contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the
atmosphere or other water course or body of water; but
this exclusion does net apply if such discharge,
dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental
• • • •

18.

Based on an analysis performed by LaSal's consultant in

a report entitled "Potential Timing of Hydrocarbon Leakage at LaSal
Oil Company," dated October 31, 1991 (the "EarthFax Report"), LaSal
asserted for purposes of argument on the cross-motions for summary
judgment only, that the date of probable onset of the leak from the
pipe referred to above in paragraph 8 of these Findings was between
February, 1983 and September, 1984.
19.

The EarthFax Report also stated that, assuming arguendo

that LaSal had contaminated the groundwater, any migration of
contaminated groundwater from the leak at the LaSal Station would
have arrived at the southern boundary of the Ross Plaintiffs'
residential properties no sooner than July, 1986.

Based on this

estimate, LaSal conceded that Omaha had no duty to defend LaSal in
the Ross Plaintiffs' Suit.
20.

After reading the parties' memoranda and hearing oral

argument on the issues of the duty to defend and indemnify, the
Court requested LaSal and Omaha to present expert testimony at an
evidentiary hearing to assist the Court in deciding whether the
5

leaks in the underground gasoline line at the LaSal Station were
"sudden."
21.

An evidentiary hearing was held before this Court on

December 17, 1992, where LaSal presented testimony through its
witnesses, Ray Klepzig and Dr. Charles Pitt, a Ph.D. in metallurgy,
and Omaha presented testimony through its expert, Dr. Franklin
Alex, also a Ph.D. in metallurgy.
22.

Dr. Pitt, LaSal's expert testified at the evidentiary

hearing that,
Corrosion of the pipe wall produced a situation where the
metal thickness at the thread roots were too small to
hold the interior pressure. At a point in time, the thin
metal fractured suddenly . . . allowing gasoline to flow
from the opening produced by the metal failure.
23.

Omaha's expert, Dr. Franklin Alex, testified at the

hearing that corrosion had caused the penetration of the pipe. Dr.
Alex stated that the corrosion started as soon as the pipe was laid
in the ground and that the process of corrosion was dependent upon
the corrosivity of the environment.

He explained that the leak

that occurred in plaintiff's gasoline transmission line was the
result of corrosion which took place over a lengthy period of time.
He further testified that the corrosive leaks at the inception are
minute and generally begin with seepage, and that the amounts of
liquid that escape from the line increase as corrosion progresses.
24.

Dr. Pitt was of the opinion that any penetration of the

metal pipe, even if it is molecular, as with corrosion, is
cons idered "sudden.H
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25.

Dr. Alex opined that a corrosion-caused leak is not

sudden.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the above facts, this Court issues the following
conclusions of law:
1.

There were property damages that potentially occurred

within the Omaha Policy period sought in the State Action and the
Hartford Suit.
2.

There was no "occurrence" within the Omaha Policy period

arising from the Ross Plaintiffs' Suit.
3.

The costs sought in the Underlying Actions constitute

"damages" under the Policy.
4. The Utah Court of Appeals case of Gridley Associates, Ltd.
v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 828 P.2d 524 (Utah App. 1992), best
defines what constitutes a "sudden and accidental" discharge in
analyzing the pollution exclusion of the Policy.
5. The phrase "sudden and accidental" in the exception to the
pollution exclusion is unambiguous.
6.

This Court adopts the language of Gridley and recognizes

that "[a]s commonly used, the meaning of sudden combines both
elements of without notice or warning and quick or brief in time.
. • . Sudden connotes a temporal aspect of immediacy, abruptness,
swiftness, quickness, instantaneous and brevity."

Gridley, 828

P.2d at 527 (quoting USF&G v. Morrison Grain Co.. 734 F.Supp 437,
446 (D. Kan. 1990) (citation omitted)).
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7.

As established in Gridley, the term "sudden" within the

"sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion cannot
be defined without reference to a temporal element, specifically,
immediacy, abruptness and quickness.

Id. at 524.

8. The length of time that elapses before an underground leak
in a gasoline transmission line is discovered or the amount of
discharge does not render an otherwise suddenly fractured line any
less sudden.
9. The facts of this case are distinguishable from the facts
in Gridley because the only conclusion that could be reached in
Gridley is that the leak was sudden, due to a "clean break."
10.

In this case, the leak in the pipe was caused by

corrosion, and cannot be considered as sudden.
11.

Because the release or discharge of gasoline from the

underground

gasoline

transmission

line

was

not

sudden,

the

pollution exclusion contained in the Omaha Policy is applicable.
Therefore, there is no coverage under the Policy to be extended to
plaintiff

for any of the claims contained in the Underlying

Actions.
12. Defendant, Omaha is entitled to a judgment dismissing all
claims of plaintiff against it in this action.
DATED this

9

day of

/^irkir*

, 1993.

BY THE COURT:

^Av— A ~n<?
e John A. Rokich
trict Court Judge
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